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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1989 to 1996, I provided legal counsel to guardians ad
litem in child protection proceedings in Hennepin County. This
aspect of my private practice gave me an opportunity denied to the
general public and most private attorneys-a glimpse into the
Hennepin County child protection system. The child protection
system includes the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) and its social workers; assistant county attorneys who
represent DCFS; assistant public defenders; disposition advisors;
private attorneys; court-appointed guardians ad litem who advise the
court of the children's best interests; service providers who contract
with DCFS to provide preservation and reunification services to
families and children; and juvenile court judges who preside over
the child protection court proceedings and are responsible for
monitoring DCFS. All these individuals constitute "stakeholders"
in the system.
Upon initial exposure to Hennepin County's child protection
system, I was struck by the startling circumstances affecting the
families and children. Before my involvement in child protection
work, I considered myself an informed citizen and an active
participant in my surrounding community. I soon discovered my
ignorance of the child protection system and the issues faced by
families and children in the system. For example, children often
languished in foster care for years without any action taken to
terminate their parents' rights, or to achieve permanent living
arrangements for them. The laws in effect prior to the current
permanency law' effective August 1, 1993, were largely ignored.
Continuances were routinely granted, causing some children to
remain in foster care for years without judicial determination of
their need for protection or services or permanency. DCFS
practices sometimes failed to prevent or even enabled the abuse
and neglect of children while in the custody of DCFS or in the
custody of parents subject to supervision by DCFS.
I especially was struck by the secrecy of the system. Since 1959,
public access to Minnesota juvenile court proceedings has been
limited by statute, which states: "[T]he court shall exclude the
general public from hearings under this chapter and shall admit
only those persons who, in the discretion of the court, have a direct
1. SeeMiNN. STAT. § 260.012(a)(2)(1998).
[Vol. 26:3
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/2
2000] OPEN CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS IN MINNESOTA 633
interest in the case or in the work of the court."' The practical
effect of this law in Hennepin County has been exclusion of the
public, press and anyone not a party to the case. In Hennepin
County, any party could exclude extended family members who
appeared outside the courtroom with the hope of observing or
providing support or information. Based on objections from the
parties, judges have excluded children's grandparents and other
relatives and, routinely, foster parents, even when they had cared
for the children for years and had substantial information about
the children's needs and the parents' history of visitation. As
interpreted, the Minnesota statute essentially guaranteed that a
parent's behavior would not be subject to scrutiny by the public,
the press or interested members of the extended family. The social
service agency also could and did seek to exclude persons from the
courtroom by simply referring to the statute and the use of the
word "shall." This invariably resulted in the requested exclusion.
My experiences suggested that such secrecy did not protect the
children, but rather served only to protect stakeholders in the
system and parents accused of child abuse or neglect. Such parents
could use closed courtroom proceedings to exclude any relatives,
friends or neighbors who had information about or were interested
in the children's welfare. Later, parents could depict DCFS, the
court and other stakeholders as the oppressors. Secrecy prevented
newspapers from reporting the circumstances and events affecting
the children's lives. Those excluded from the proceedings could
not hear first-hand the allegations of abuse and neglect of the
children, the corrective action required of the parents or decisions
about the children's placement. Most importantly, those excluded
lost the opportunity to offer the court relevant information about
the parents' and children's circumstances. Relatives who never
entered the courtroom tended to rally around the parents, not the
children who suffered mistreatment. Moreover, these relatives may
have been less inclined to step forward as a possible placement for
the children because misinformation from parents encouraged
mistrust of the system.
Secrecy surrounding the child protection system prevented
many private attorneys from penetrating the system. Court
proceedings sometimes deviated from the Rules of Juvenile
2. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 1 (c) (1998) (formerly codified as MINN.
STAT. § 260.155, subd. l(c)).
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Procedure and the relevant statutes. Insiders used numerous
acronyms, their meanings known only to the insiders. Outside
attorneys were at a clear disadvantage unless they learned the
special rules and language.
This essay discusses the background of and recent departure
from the traditional secrecy enveloping child protection hearings.
Part II presents a brief history of the juvenile protection system.
Part III discusses the constitutional and legal basis for open and
public trials. Part IV presents the development of Minnesota's Pilot
Project for open child protection proceedings. Part V discusses the
reception of the Pilot Project and discusses successes of the Pilot
Project. Part VI presents arguments for continuing and expanding
the open hearings. Part VII concludes that, so far, opponents' fears
are unfounded and that open hearings are necessary to protect
children and hold accountable the system charged with protecting
them.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OFJUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
A. Early Develapment
Though the Puritans of Massachusetts enacted laws against
"unnatural severity" to children as early as the seventeenth century;
these laws offered only limited protection against child abuse.
Before the twentieth century, family and religious institutions
played the strongest role in controlling, disciplining and protecting
minors.4 Americans' overriding concern about family privacy
discouraged the state from intervening to protect or rescue•• 5
children from their families. Although courts recognized "public
matters" such as drunkenness or criminality as grounds for removal
of children, many considered "physical cruelty to the child" a
private matter notjustifying removal. Moreover, the United States
3. See Wright S. Walling & Gary Debele, Private CHIPS Petitions in Minnesota:
The Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protection or Services,
20 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 781, 785 (1994) (noting that these seventeenth-century
laws formed the first response in America to deal with child abuse and neglect).
4. See Gary A. Debele, The Origins and Early Years of American Juvenile
Courts: The Impact of Changes in American Domestic Relations Law and Criminal
Procedure from 1880 to 1920 1 (1991) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Minnesota) (on file with author).
5. See Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 796 n.98.
6. See id. at 790-91.
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did not have special courts to address children's problems.7
Children generally received "special treatment" from courts of
general jurisdiction but the children did not enjoy special
procedural or substantive rights based on their youth.8
From 1877 to 1920, rapid changes occurred in American
society such as the closing frontier, growth of cities, growth of
monopolies and large-scale reform movements such as Populism9
and Progressivism.' At the same time, community autonomy
eroded and political authority grew increasingly centralized." As
the nation evolved from a rural, homogeneous nation into an
industrial and urban nation, growing sectors of American society
concerned themselves with the treatment of juveniles.12 In 1889, a
reformatory for boys opened in St. Cloud, Minnesota, and in 1911,
a "school for delinquent girls" started in Sauk Centre.13 According
to historian Robert Wiebe, if reformers "had a central theme, it was
the child," who "united the campaigns for health, education, and a
richer city environment, and.., dominated much of the interest in" 14
labor legislation. In the law, a major indication of new attitudes
was "the establishment of specialized juvenile and domestic
relations courts which came to emphasize counseling and
mediation as much as pronouncements of law.... "" The creators
ofjuvenile court intended that it "be operated by professionals and
without all of the due process intricacies" found in the adult
criminal court.
Minnesota established a juvenile court system near the start of
7. See Debele, supra note 4, at 1.
8. See id. at 1.
9. Populism refers to the nineteenth-century political movement that
championed local loyalties, direct democracy, nationalization of monopolies and a
silver-based currency. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 84
(1967).
10. Progressivism was a late nineteenth, early twentieth-century political
reform movement that advocated state protection of laborers and the poor, and
pushed for "regulation of oligopolistic industries, antitrust enforcement, labor
union organization, and social insurance." DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 144-45 (1991).
11. See Debele, supra note 4, at 28.
12. See Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 796.
13. See THEODORE C. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 435 (2d ed.
1975).
14. WIEBE, supra note 9, at 169.
15. Id. at 150.
16. Debele, supra note 4, at 3-4.
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the twentieth century. 7 In 1899, the state legislature passed "An
Act Establishing a Protection System for Juvenile Delinquents,"
8
requiring counties with more than 50,000 residents to provide
probation for children under the age of eighteen, at the discretion
of the trial judge. Minnesota's Juvenile Court Act followed in
1905. 19 In counties with more than 50,000 residents, the 1905 Act
provided for a special judge and courtroom for juvenile
delinquency matters where a "juvenile record" would be
maintained.20 The goal of the early juvenile courts "was to take the
place of an absent, nurturing family under the hands of maternal
morality. The best interests of the child was the justification of the
court's very existence."
21
In the later nineteenth century and early twentieth century,
the state primarily relied on a "law enforcement" approach for
22addressing the needs of abused and neglected children. State
agents exercised broad police powers, "including the power to
separate children from their parents and prosecute parents who
could be subsequently sentenced to prison. Many reformers
criticized this punitive approach, arguing that the government
should launch "preventive, remedial, and economic efforts to
improve the home" so that children could remain at home.24
Nevertheless, states enacted laws providing for summary
25procedures to commit children to institutions. In many instances,
children legally were removed from their parents and placed in
institutions without any hearing or notice to the parents. Courts
justified such actions under the medieval English doctrine of parens
patriae (parent of the nation), "which permitted the crown,
through Chancery court proceedings, to intervene on behalf of a
child whose welfare was threatened."2 7 Based on the notion that
juvenile courts would be kinder and more loving toward children
than adult courts, early juvenile courts engaged in "preventive
17. See BLEGEN, supra note 13, at 439.
18. 1899 Minn. Laws ch. 154.
19. 1905 Minn. Laws ch. 285, § 1.
20. See id.; Debele, supra note 4, at 83.
21. Debele, supra note 4, at 120.
22. See Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 795-97.
23. Id. (citing Mason P. Thomas. Jr., Child Abuvps and \Teglet Part I.- ibt rrial
Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 312 (1972)).
24. See id. at 796.
25. See Thomas, supra note 23, at 315.
26. See id.
27. Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 797.
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penology that associated poverty and neglect with crime,
disregarded notions of procedural due process, and vigorously
employed the parens patriae philosophy to justify state intervention
in private families. 28 As Debele remarks:
[T]he rise of the American juvenile courts during this
period reveals a darker side of American law. During this
period of great social and cultural tumult, the white, middle
and upper class Protestants long dominant in American
society prior to the 1880's turned to the time-tested tool of
American problem resolution-the rule of law. Under the
cloak of the rule of law, controls were maintained by this
group over urban and immigrant children-the very future
of the republic.29
By the 1950s, the preventive penology and law enforcement
approaches gave way to a social work methodology known as
"protective services."30 This methodology sought to strengthen the
child's home instead of punishing or institutionalizing members of
the child's family. 31 Mandatory child abuse reporting laws were
enacted in light of the widely accepted belief that what "protective
services offered to a family in its own home was usually a sufficient
way to protect the child."3 2  Most states increased services and
protection available to dependent, abused and neglected
children,3 and sought to identify and redress a family's problem
instead of punishing the parents.
As the protective services methodology spread, many
reformers developed a greater apprehension about state
interference.35 They came to recognize that state intervention
endangers individual rights and often produces negative results
toward children.36 In the 1950s and 1960s, the juvenile court
experienced a due process revolution in juvenile court
28. Id. at 798.
29. Debele, supra note 4, at 120.
30. See Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 798.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 802.
33. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILYVIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987).
34. See Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 801.
35. See id. at 802.
36. See id.
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37procedures. Many reformers grew convinced that criminal
sanctions against abusive or neglectful parents only made matters
more difficult for families.3s All fifty states now provide statutory
mechanisms for protecting children from parents whom the state
deems neglectful or abusive.3 9
B. Federal Intervention
The passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 (Act), significantly changed child welfare law in the
United States.4' The Act passed in response to widespread criticism
42of the child welfare system. The Act is based upon threeprinciples: (1) preventing unnecessary foster care placements, (2)
37. See id. at 800.
38. See id. at 801.
39. See ALA. CODE§ 26-15-3 (1999), ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.100 (Michie 1999),
ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-3623 (1989), ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-204 (Michie 1999), CAL
WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West 1998), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-508 (West
1999), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21 (1999), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1102 (1999),
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2105 (1999), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806 (West 1999), GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-70 (1999); HAw. REv. STAT. § 709-904 (1999), IDAHO CODE § 18-1501
(1997), 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-21.6 (West 1999), IND. CODE 35-46-1-4 (1999),
IOWA CODE § 726.6 (1996), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1527 (1998), KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 530.060 (Michie 1998), LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 621 (West 1995), ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 554 (West 1999), MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35C (1996);
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 24 (1999); MICH. COMP. LAwS. ANN. § 750.136b (West
1999), MINN. STAT. § 609.378 (1998), MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-301 (1999), MO.
REV. STAT. § 568.045 (1998), MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-622 (1997), NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 43-292 (West 1999), NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.508 (1997), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
639:3 (1999), N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:24-4(a) (West 1998), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1
(Michie 1997), N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10(1)(McKinney 1999), N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7B-1111 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1999), OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2151.03 (West 1996), OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 7106 (1998), OR. REV. STAT. § 163.547
(1997), 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 1995), R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-5
(1998), S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490 (Law. Co-op. 1999), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-
1 (Michie 1998), TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401 (1998), TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
22.041 (West 1999), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (1999), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §
4915 (1999), VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6 (Michie 1998), WASH. REV. CODE §
13.34.050 (1999), W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-4 (1996), WIs. STAT. § 948.03 (1996), WVo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-208 (Michie 1999); see also Samuel Broderick Sokol, Trying
Dependency Cases in Public: A First Amendment Inquiry, 45 UCLA L. REv. 881, 882
(1998) (citing Wanda Ellen Wakerfield, Annotation, Validity of State Statute
Providing for Termination of Parental Rights, 22 A.L.R. 4th 774 (1983)).
40. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., including
sections 670 and 675).
41. See Leonard P. Edwards, Improving Implementation of the Federal Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 45Juv. & FAM. Or.J. 3, 3 (1994).
42. See id. at 4.
[Vol. 26:3
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timely and safe reunification of children in foster care with their
biological parents when possible, and (3) expeditious adoption of
children unable to return home.43 The Act was the "first Federal
statute to discourage excessive reliance on foster care placement
and promote greater use of services to assist and rehabilitate
families, preventing out-of-home placements. It introduced the
concept of permanency planning and incorporated specific time
frames for decision making for children and families."44 The Act
"created responsibilities for juvenile court judges, making them an
integral part of the operation of the law."45 The Act requiresjuvenile
court judges to monitor the activities of social service agencies
before, during and after the state removes children from the
custody of parents or guardians. 46 Additional legislative initiatives
supporting or promoting permanency followed the Act.
47
Unfortunately, the Act has not been fully implemented within
the child protection system.4" Throughout the United States,
juvenile court oversight of social service agencies has remained
ineffective or nonexistent due to several implementation
problems. Implementation has been hampered by inadequate
funding of social service agencies and public disagreement
regarding the removal of children. 5° Moreover, some judges either
misunderstand or refuse to exercise their power "to rule on social
service failures."
51
Minnesota's statutory scheme has been described as a "model
for consideration" with regard to implementing the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act. 2  In 1988, the Minnesota
legislature revised its child protection laws and designated all
43. See id. at 4-5.
44. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADOPTION 2002:
THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC
POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN, 1-4 (June
1999) [hereinafter ADOPTION 2002].
45. Edwards, supra note 41, at 3.
46. See42 U.S.C. § 670 (1994).
47. See ADOPTION 2002, supra note 44, at 1-4. "These included the Family
Preservation and Family Support Services Program (FPFS) established in 1993 and
amended in 1997, the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 (MEPA) with its 1996
Interethnic Placement Provisions (IEP), and the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA) enacted in November of 1997." Id.
48. See Edwards, supra note 41, at 7.
49. See id. at 4, 7.
50. See id. at 4.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 12-13.
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dependent and neglected children as "children in need of
protection or services," now known as "CHIPS" children. 3  The
legislative changes reflected the philosophy "that children should
remain in their home or a reasonable facsimile of their home."
34
Though the statutory bases have expanded for finding that a
Minnesota child is a CHIPS child, the move away from punishing
parents and toward providing 
services continues.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 199756 (ASFA)
reinforces and extends the policies promoted by the Adoption
Assistance Act. This new federal legislation:
most comprehensively addresses critical permanency issues
in child welfare and the law. The law was a bipartisan
action to ensure that children's safety would be the
paramount concern of all child welfare decision-making
and to promote the adoption of children who cannot
return safely to their own homes.
ASFA includes the following principles:
* Safety is the paramount concern that must guide all
child welfare services.
* Foster care is temporary.
* Permanency planning efforts should begin as soon as a
child enters care.
* The child welfare system must focus on results and
accountability.
" Innovative approaches are needed to achieve the foals
of safety, permanency and well-being.
58
C. Need For Further Progress
Much progress has been made. Increased public awareness
has resulted in more attention to children's needs, reunifying
children with their parents when possible and closer judicial
53. See Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673 § 2, 1988 Minn. Laws 1031, 1032-33; see
also Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 809.
54. See Walling & Debele, supra note 3, at 813 (citing MINN. STAT. § 260.011,
subd. 2(a) (1992)).
55. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 260.011, subd. 2(a) (1993)).
56. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §§ 101-501,
111 Stat. 2115-2136 (1997).
57. ADOPTION 2002, supra note 44, at 1-5.
58. See id. at 1-5--6.
[Vol. 26:3
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scrutiny of agencies. Still, as a matter of course, juvenile courts
largely remain closed. Without open hearings, juvenile court
proceedings generally remain secretive affairs. Public access to
courts, a long-recognized tradition in American jurisprudence,
provides information the public needs to properly assess the quality
of protection to children and serves as an appropriate monitor of
government.
III. LEGAL SUPPORT FOR OPEN AND PUBLIC TRIALS
Historically, both federal and state case law support open
hearings, even when those hearings involve highly sensitive issues.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees public
access to most court proceedings under its free speech and press
clauses.59
A court proceeding is presumed open if it traditionally has
been public and if public access would benefit its operation.6 In
applying this test, most courts have denied the public the right of
61access to court proceedings involving child protection matters.
States are obliged to reunify parents and children, but when
reunification fails, states have the power to terminate parental
62rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated "[f]ew forms of state
,,63
action are both so severe and so irreversible, yet the public and
media are generally excluded from the courtj roceedings in which
these "severe and irreversible" actions occur. Some legal scholars
argue that laws that mandate closing dependency court
proceedings violate the First Amendment."' If true, the public and
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; ... ").
60. SeeJack B. Harrison, How Open is Open? The Development of the Public Access
Doctrine Under State Open Court Provisions, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1307, 1310-12 (1992)
(discussing the evolution of the presumption in America that all should have
access to the courts and that court proceedings should be open to the public).
61. See Jan L. Trasen, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: Do
Closed Hearings Protect the Child or the System?, 15 B.C. THIRD WoRLD L.J. 359, 373-74
(1995) ("The vast majority of states have statutes within their juvenile codes that
grant the juvenile court judge the discretion to admit or exclude the public from
juvenile proceedings.").
62. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (holding that states
must show more than a fair preponderance of evidence to terminate parental
rights).
63. Id. at 759.
64. See Sokol, supra note 39, at 883 (describing the extent to which courts are
closed in various states).
65. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)
11
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the media have a constitutional right to attend dependency court
proceedings and any party seeking to close such a proceeding
would bear the burden of demonstrating that closure is
"necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."66
The U.S. Supreme Court in four cases in the 1980s, defined
67the public's right to attend criminal court proceedings. The
Court held that the public has a right to attend all criminal trials,
including 7Jury selection,8 preliminary hearings69 and witness
testimony.
A. Federal Case Law
1. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,71 the public's First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to attend criminal trials outweighed
the defendant's concern about adverse effects. The case involved a
72trial court's order to close a murder trial to the public and press.
The defendant argued that publicity of the case would adversely
73affect the trial process. Richmond Newspapers brought
mandamus and prohibition petitions, but the Virginia Supreme
Court dismissed them.74  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the
presumptive right of the public and the press to attend criminal
trials. 75
In justifying its holding, the Court listed several benefits to the
public of public attendance at criminal trials: community catharsis,
education, increased public understanding of the rule of law,
(striking down a statute that excluded the general public from a trial involving a
minor victim of a sexual offense).
66. Id. at 607.
67. Sokol, supra note 39, at 884 n.13.
68. See Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)
[hereinafter Press 1].
69. See Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
70. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 575-81 (1980); Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610 (striking down a statute excluding the general public
from minor sex victim trials).
71. 448 U.S. b55 (l98).
72. See id. at 560.
73. See id. at 561.
74. See id. at 562.
75. See id. at 581.
[Vol. 26:3
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increased comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal
justice system and public confidence in the administration of• , 76
justice. The Court also described several benefits to the
proceeding itself: enhanced performance, protection of the judge,
and possibly bringing a proceeding to the attention of persons who
might be able to furnish relevant evidence or contradict evidence
already admitted.7 7
Tracing the history of the public's right to attend criminal
trials, Chief Justice Burger approvingly quoted Jeremy Bentham's
proposition that "[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are
insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of
small account."78 The Chief Justice also emphasized Bentham's
idea that "open proceedings enhanc[e] the performance of all
involved, protec[t] the judge from imputations of dishonesty, and
serv[e] to educate the public."79 Burger's opinion pointed out that
public trials have a "significant community therapeutic value" 0 and
provide "an opportunity both for understanding the system in
general and its workings in a particular case."8 1 He noted that
public exposure to trials, even through the media, "contribute [s] to
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of
the functioning of the entire criminal justice system." 2 The Chief
Justice stated:
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of
outrage and public protest often follows. Thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion. Without an awareness that society's
responses to criminal conduct are underway, natural
human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated ....
[N]o community catharsis can occur ifjustice is "done in a
corner [or] in any covert manner.8s
76. See id. at 569-72.
77. See id. at 569.
78. Id. at 569 (quoting 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
524 (1827)).
79. Id. at 569 n. 7.
80. Id. at 570.
81. Id. at 572.
82. Id. at 573 (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587
(1976).
83. Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
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Justice Brennan agreed with the Chief Justice, noting that
"debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open," as well as "informed."8 Justice Brennan, however, expressed
concern that the logic of his argument might be used to require
public access to any judicial proceeding, and he warned that
"access to a particular government process" depends on the
function of the particular proceeding. To Justice Brennan, the
relevant issue was not the benefit of access for a particular citizen,
but rather the benefit of access to the proceeding itself.
86
2. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Cour(7 further expanded
Richmond Newspapers to allow the public into a trial even when
minor rape victims testify. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that a state statute required closing sex-offense trials
during the testimony of juvenile sex crime victims. The statute in
question provided an automatic bar to all cases in which minor
victims of sex offenses testified, even if the victim, defendant, and
prosecutor raised no objections to an open trial. Representatives
of the Globe sought to attend a rape trial in which two minor rape
victims were expected to testify. 89 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that closing the court proceeding for even a limited time during
testimony of a very sensitive nature violated the First Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated that "the right of
access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a
whole."9l
Richmond Newspapers made clear that the right of access to
criminal court proceedings could be restricted only upon a
showing that the restriction was "necessitated by a compelling
84. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
85. Id. at 589 (noting that access to a government process must be "important
in terms of that process").
86. See id. (comparing In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970)).
87. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
88. See id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. See id. at 598.
90. See id. at 610-11. "We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one: that a
rule of mandatory closure respecting the testimony of minor sex victims is
constitutionally infirm." Id. at 611 n.27.
91. Id. at 606.
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governmental interest and [was] narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."92 Globe Newspaper extended the analysis and provided an
important qualification. Massachusetts argued that safeguarding
the physical and psychological well being of testifying minor rape
victims was a compelling interest necessitating a restriction of the
93public's access to the proceeding. Though a majority of the
justices agreed that this interest was "potentially compelling," the
Court held that the statute mandating closure whenever such
minors testified was not "narrowly tailored."94 In order to meet the
requirement that the restriction be "narrowly tailored,"
Massachusetts trial courts were required to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether a minor actually would be harmed by testifying in
public and whether any available alternatives to restricting public
access to the proceeding existed.95 Massachusetts also claimed that
closing the proceedings would encourage minor victims of sex
crimes to come forward and provide accurate testimony and that
this result constituted a compelling interest sufficient to justify the96
restriction on the public's right of access. Because the state
provided no support for its claim, however, the Court did not
decide this question.97
3. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press I)" presented
compelling issues-protecting jurors' right to privacy and sealing a
transcript from a preliminary hearing for murder-but compelling
issues alone are not sufficient. The courts also must consider
alternatives to closing a hearing that address both the compelling
issues and the public's right to know. A California trial court
closed to the public all but three days of a six-week voir dire of a
capital jury.99 The trial court asserted two interests to justify the
closure: the defendant's right to a fair trial and the jurors' right to
92. Id. at 607.
93. See id. at 607 n.19.
94. See id. at 609.
95. See id. at 608. The court listed factors to be weighed in determining
harm. The factors included the minor victim's age, psychological maturity, the
crime, the victim's desires, and the interests of parents and relatives. See id.
96. See id. at 609.
97. See id. at 609-10.
98. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
99. See id. at 503.
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privacy. 10 Noting that the public right of access to jury selection
was common practice in the United States when the Constitution
was adopted, the Court restated the applicable standard that "[t] he
presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'01 The
Court found California's asserted interests to be insufficient to
justify closure because the trial court failed to make adequate
findings and did not consider alternatives to closure.10
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press II),1"s the Supreme
Court reversed a magistrate's order sealing the transcript of a forty-
one day preliminary hearing in a capital murder trial. 1°4 The
hearing was a recent development of the California criminal law,
making historical analysis difficult for the Court. Seven of the
justices likened the proceeding to preliminary hearings for
criminal trials, which historically were open to the public; 0 5 two of
the justices likened it to a grand jury, which historically was closed
to the public. 10 Because the California courts had not considered
alternatives to closure, the Supreme Court held that the order was
neither "essential to preserve higher values" nor "narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.'
07
4. Lower Court Rulings
The U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the First
Amendment beyond its application to criminal proceedings,0' but
some lower courts have considered the issue. In Publicker Industries,
Inc. v. Cohen,1°9 the Third Circuit held that "the First Amendment
embraces a right of access to [civil] trials" and that "public access to
civil trials 'enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
factfinding process.""'0 The Second, Sixth and Seventh Circuits
100. See id.
101. Id. at 510.
102. See id. at 510-11.
103. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
104. See id. at 4-6.
105. See id. at 15.
106. See id. at 26.
107. Id. at 13-14 (quoting Hess], 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
108. See Sokol, supra note 39, at 895.
109. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/2
2000] OPEN CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS IN MINNESOTA 647
likewise approved this reasoning."' The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has not addressed the issue but a Fifth Circuit district court
has held that the First Amendment guarantees public access to civil
trials." 2 By implication, the Fourth Circuit has approved the
existence of the right of access to civil trials."3 The First, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have not specifically
addressed the issue.1
4
B. State Case Law
1. Minnesota Adult Court Cases
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that excluding the
public from adult criminal proceedings violates the defendant's
constitutional right to a public trial. In State v. Scnmit,"6  a
sodomy case, the trial judge excluded over the defendant's
objections all but members of the bar and press and the
defendant's relatives and friends."7  Reversing the trial court
decision, the supreme court offered numerous arguments for the
importance and necessity of public trials. The court stated that
"the right to a public trial can scarcely be regarded as less
fundamental and essential to a fair trial than the right to assistance
of counsel, also granted by the Sixth Amendment."" The court
explained that right to a public trial is a "limited privilege" subject
to the court's power to exclude persons "for the preservation of
order and decorum in the courtroom and to protect the rights of
parties and witnesses."" 9 The court added that:
Where it appears that minors are unable to testify
111. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.
1984); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983).
112. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (stating, upon review of other circuits, that closed trials are a "serious
impairment of the public's ability to scrutinize governmental activity.... .").
113. See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.
1988) (affirming a right of access to documents filed in a summary judgment
motion in a civil defamation case, barring compelling government interest).
114. See Sokol, supra note 39, at 897.
115. See State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 80-81, 139 N.W.2d 800, 802 (1966).
116. 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966).
117. See id. at 79, 139 N.W.2d at 802.
118. Id. at 80, 139 N.W.2d at 803.
119. Id.
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competently and coherently before an audience because
of embarrassment or fright, temporary exclusion of the
public is permissible. Our prior decisions hold that an
adult witness may also be protected by temporary
exclusion of the public when it appears that
embarrassment prevents a full recital of the facts."'
The Schmit court observed that a majority of jurisdictions
defined a "public trial" to mean "a trial which the general public is
free to attend."' Noting that "[t]he doors of the courtroom are
expected to be kept open," the court referenced cases from other
states that "reversed convictions obtained at trials where the public
was excluded solely on account of the salacious nature of the crime
or testimony likely to be given."122 Though the exclusion orders
made exceptions for friends, designated reporters or members of123
the bar, the orders were struck down in each case. Addressing
the case at hand, the supreme court noted that the presence of
reporters at the trial would not guarantee "such complete,
accurate, and impartial reporting as is necessary to safeguard
defendant's rights or protect against judicial oppression .... ,,4
Moreover, the court was not persuaded that "members of the bar,
relatives, and friends can assume either to represent or speak for
the entire community interest in securing that kind of judicial
administration which is fair both to the accused and the
S ,,125
prosecution.
The Schmit court stated that "there is a vast difference between
a trial from which everyone but a special class of persons is
excluded and one which everyone except a designated few is free to
attend." 126 The court noted that:
[The Constitution] contemplates that an accused be
afforded all possible benefits that a trial open to the public
is designed to assure. Unrestricted public scrutiny of
judicial action is a meaningful assurance to an accused that
120. Id. at 81-82, 139 N.W.2d at 803-04 (footnotes omitted).
121. Id. at 83-84, 139 N.W.2d at 804.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 83-84, 139 N.W.2d at 804-05; see also Davis v. United States, 247 F.
394 (8th Cir. 1917).
124. Schmit, 273 Minn. at 83-83, 139 N.W.2d at 804-05.
125. Id. at 85-86, 139 N.W.2d at 806.
126. Id. at 84, 139 N.W.2d at 804.
[Vol. 26:3
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/2
2000] OPEN CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS IN MINNESOTA 649
he will be dealt with justly, protected not only against gross
abuses of judicial power but also petty arbitrariness. The
presence of an -audience does have a wholesome effect on
trustworthiness since witnesses are less likely to testify
falsely before a public gathering. Further, the possibility
that some spectator drawn to the trial may prove to be an
undiscovered witness in possession of critical evidence
cannot be ignored.1
7
In State v. McRae,12 the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a
trial court order closing an adult criminal trial during testimony of
a teenage complainant. The complainant was a fifteen-year-old
girl who was sexually assaulted after she left a bus in Minneapolis
and tried to find a friend's apartment.3 ° The trial judge had based
131
the order on Minnesota Statutes section 631.045, which
permitted exclusion of the public when the minor is victim and
"closure is necessary to protect a witness or ensure fairness in the
trial." 3 2 It held that closing the courtroom was "appropriate in
these circumstances, given the fact that she's 15 years old and that
she did appear to the Court [in an off-the-record hearing] to be
extremely apprehensive about her appearance here today."1 33 In
overturning the trial court, the supreme court noted that the trial
court did not record its interview of the minor and thus "[t]he
record does not disclose evidence or findings of a showing that
closure was necessary to protect the witness or ensure fairness in
the trial."'
In State v. Fageroos,13 5 the defendant was convicted of first
degree burglary and first degree criminal sexual conduct. The trial
court closed the courtroom during the testimony of the
complainant and her sister, both minors. 1 6  The defendant
127. Id. at 806-07 (footnotes omitted).
128. 494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992).
129. See id. at 259.
130. See id. at 253.
131. See id. at 258.
132. MINN. STAT. § 631.045 (1990). The language of this statutory section has
not changed except to update statutory sections referenced therein. See MINN.
STAT. § 631.045 (1998).
133. McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 258.
134. Id. at 259.
135. 531 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1995).
136. See id. at 201.
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appealed contending that the trial court committed error.137 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed on all other issues but
remanded to the trial court for "findings to support the closure" of
the trial.'38 After the trial court made findings, the defendant again
appealed contending that the findings were inadequate to support
closure. 39  The court of appeals affirmed.'" The defendant
appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that the
findings were inadequate to support closure but also decided that
the case should be remanded to the trial court so that the state
could have the opportunity to try to establish that closure was141
necessary. If the state could not establish that closure was
necessary, the court stated that the defendant would be entitled to
a new trial. 42  Justice Tomijanovich dissented, stating that she
would have remanded the case for a new trial.43 She wrote: "I can
appreciate that it will be embarrassing and awkward for the alleged
victim and her sister to testify with spectators present at the trial;
however, that alone is not a sufficient basis on which to deny a
public trial." 1'
In State v. Biebinger, the defendant appealed from a
conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and
sentence as a patterned sex offender. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial holding that the
closure had occurred without adequate findings of necessity and
availabilt of other, better alternatives to closure.'" Citing State v.
Fageroos, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the appropriate
remedy for the defendant was a remand for an evidentiary hearing
regarding the necessity of closure because this hearing might
remedy the violation.14
The courts have been more restrictive in otherwise open court
137. See id. at 200.
138. See State v. Fageroos, No. CO-92-1896, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.July 20, 1993).
139. See State v. Fageroos, No. C1-93-2453, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17,
1994).
140. See id.
141. See Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d at 203.
142. See id.
143. See id. (Tomljanovich, I., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. 585 N.W.2d 384 (Minn. 1998).
146. See id. at 385.
147. 531 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1995).
148. See Biebinger, 585 N.W.2d at 385.
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proceedings when juveniles testify. In Austin Daily Herald v. Mork, 49
the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld an order excluding the
public from a criminal trial during the testimony ofjuveniles, even
though reporters were permitted to attend on condition that they
not report the names of juveniles or information about previous
confidential juvenile proceedings. 5 Mower County District Court
Judge James L. Mork ruled that during cross-examination the
defendant would be given wide latitude to inquire into the
juveniles' prior contacts with the juvenile court system,'15 and thus
the cross-examination would result in disclosure of information not
generally accessible to the public. The court of appeals held that
"[t]he state's interest in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile
records and proceedings, while not unlimited, is 'important and
substantial. Further, the court held "[c]oupled with the
compelling governmental interest in safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of juvenile witnesses, this interest supports
the decision to limit access.
",15
In State v. Bashire,154 the state moved for closure of the
courtroom during the testimony of two juvenile victims. The
defendant did not object and instead agreed to a limited closure.
55
The trial court made no findings of necessity for closure but the
court of appeals held that the defendant's failure to object and his
agreement waived any error that could be predicated on the lack offindings.'-%
2. Minnesota Juvenile Court Cases
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered public access to a
juvenile court proceeding in In re R.L.K, Jr. and T.L.K v.
Minnesota.'57 Petitions to terminate parental rights of G.T.K and
R.L.K were filed in December 1977 and February 1978.1m A
149. 507 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (order denying writ of
prohibition).
150. See id. at 858.
151. See id. at 856.
152. Id. at 858 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Lee, 353 N.W.2d 213,
215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
153. Id.
154. 606 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
155. See id. at 450.
156. See id. at 454-55.
157. 269 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 1978).
158. See id. at 368.
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reporter for the Minneapolis Star and Tribune attended the start of
the juvenile court proceeding. 5 9 When the parents questioned the
reporter's presence, the court replied that "the rules of court allow
the press to observe any hearings of that court and.., that the
reporter had agreed not to identify the children in any story.'160
The court added that "the public has a right to know how this
Court conducts its business, especially in a Court having as much
power as this one."
161
The parents' attorney objected to the reporter's presence and
requested that the hearing be private because "what might come
out of this trial might be rather difficult for certain people in this
courtroom emotionally. 16' The children's attorney took no
position on the reporter's presence but the assistant Hennepin
County attorney said that the hearing should be private. 16 The
juvenile court responded that the proceedings "should be private
but not secret," and the reporter promised on the record not to use
the name of anyone and to mask all addresses.' 64 The court
overruled the parents' objection "on the basis of the 'public's right
to know its business' which 'overrides the potential injury that's
been mentioned to me.' 165
Subsequent to this discussion, the attorneys and court
addressed Minnesota Statute section 260.155, subdivision 1. ' 6 The
court stated that "one of the very basic cornerstones of American
democracy is the public's right to know how governmental power is
being exercised." 67  The court added that "the press, as
representative of the general public, does have a direct interest in
the work of the Court. It would seem to me the press is clearly
under the intent of the Legislature. " '68 The court then denied a
further motion by the parents to exclude the reporter and the








166. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 1(c) (1998) (formerly codified as Minn.
Stat.§ 260.155, subd. 1 (c)) (permitting exclusion of all individuals without a direct
interest in the case).
167. In re RL.K. and T.L.K, 269 N.W.2d at 369.
168. Id. at 369.
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a writ of prohibition with the Minnesota Supreme Court.6 9 The
day after the above-noted hearing, an article appeared in the
newspaper describing the events at the hearing. The article did not
identify the children or parents' names or addresses.
70
On appeal, the Assistant County Attorney took no position on
the issue; the children's attorney for the first time argued in favor
of excluding the reporter.'7 ' The newspaper was allowed to
proceed amicus curiae and participate in oral argument before the
supreme court. 72 The issue presented to the court was "whether
the juvenile court erred pursuant to Minn. St. 260.155, subd. 1, in
denying petitioners' motion to exclude the news media from the
juvenile proceeding."7 3 Petitioners argued that "the cornerstone of
Uuvenile court] policy of protecting family ties is the privacy
accorded juvenile records and proceedings. "M They claimed that
"to allow news media representatives to attend a juvenile
proceeding over the objections of the parties would render the
Minnesota juvenile court system indistinguishable from the adult
criminal adjudicative process." 75 Petitioners also argued that the
juvenile proceedings should be private unless the permission of
everyone concerned was obtained.1
76
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the juvenile court
possessed discretion to admit those who "have a direct interest [in
the case] or in the work of the court.", 77 It held that "[t]he weight
of authority is that the news media have a 'direct interest' in the
work of a juvenile court and it is not an abuse of discretion to allow
a reporter to be present at a juvenile proceeding. 178The court
noted that:
The news media have a strong interest in obtaining
information regarding our legal institutions and an
interest in informing the public about how judicial power








176. See id. at 370.
177. Id. at 37.
178. See id.
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clearly have "a direct interest... in the work of the court"
within the meaning of Minn. St. 260.155, subd. 1 ... 179
In 1993, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued an
unpublished opinion denying a writ of mandamus sought by
Northwest Publications against the district court judge Anne V.
Simonett. 18 The petitioner sought to compel the trial court "to
admit a reporter to a hearing on the termination of parental rights,
where the reporter's attendance was requested by the mother
whose rights were at issue."18' Ruling against the petition, the court
held that the trial court possessed discretion to admit or deny
reporters to termination hearings,182 and that "mandamus may not
be used to control judicial discretion. " 8
In Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Schmidt,' the Minnesota
Court of Appeals granted a writ of prohibition in a case in which
the juvenile court: 1) denied the paper's motion to open the
pending proceedings; 2) denied the paper's access to juvenile
court records about the pending proceeding; 3) prohibited the
news media generally from publishing information about the
matter; and 4) forbade trial participants from discussing or
releasing information about the matter to the media.'8 The Star
Tribune contested only the third portion of the juvenile court's
order, which stated:
[N]o representatives of the news media shall identify in
any story or any news report in any way the identities of
any juvenile connected with this case, whether as a party
or as a witness; nor, the identity of the Respondent
parents involved in this case. That this shall include
prohibition on the disclosure or identification of any such
person or minor by name, residence, occupation, place of
school attendance, foster placement, photographs,
sketches, or any reference to previously identified
179. Id. at 370-71.
180. See Northwest Publications, Inc. v. The Honorable Anne V. Simonett,
Judge of District Court, No. C7-93-1968 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1993) (order
denying petition for writ of mandamus) (citing Minn. Stat. §.RR-01 (I992)).
181. See id. at 1.
182. Id. (citing In reWelfare of R.L.K.,Jr., 269 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn. 1978)).
183. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 586.01 (1992)).
184. 360 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
185. See id. at 434.
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characteristics.'86
Subsequently, the juvenile court amended this provision to include
"'the names of all attorneys of record in this case among those
persons whose identity shall not be revealed in any story or news
report.'"' 7
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the juvenile
court erred in prohibiting the news media from publishing
information about a pending juvenile court matter when the
information was obtained legally from "public records and
independent sources. " l8 The Minnesota Court of Appeals began
its analysis by noting that "the main purpose of the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press was 'to prevent
previous restraints upon publication.'"'8 9 The court emphasized
that "[a]ny prior restraint of speech is reviewed 'bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.'"' 9 Though the
juvenile court justified its order by the compelling interest that
"one of the children involved would be traumatized by further
publicity,"' gl the child's psychiatrist testified that the primary causes
of the child's anxiety were "recurrent interrogation and removal
from the home."
192
The court of appeals held that the juvenile court's order was
an unconstitutional prior restraint of publication because it "was
not 'narrowly tailored' to protect the purported compelling
interest."193 The court stated that a potential increase in a child's
anxiety does not constitute a compelling state interest sufficient to
justify "a restraint on the publication of information obtained from
public records and independent sources."194 The court stated:
By placing the information in the public domain on
official court records, the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby served.




189. Id. at 435 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)).
190. Id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 436.
194. Id.
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concerned with the administration of government, and a
public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true
contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the
press to publish that information appears to us to be of
critical importance to our type of government in which
the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of
public business.
95
3. Other States' Case Law
The Ohio Supreme Court, New Jersey Supreme Court and a
panel of the California Court of Appeal have considered public
access to dependency court hearings. The Ohio Supreme Court' 9
and a panel of the California Court of Appeals' 97 considered and
rejected a First Amendment right to attend dependency court
proceedings. The New Jersey court, however, expressly held that
the public's right to attend civil trials encompasses the qualified
right to attend dependency cases.'98
4. Conclusion
Federal and state cases strongly support open public trials.
Even limited restrictions upon public attendance are met with
vehement objections by defense counsel and strong disapproval by
appellate courts. If adults deserve the protection offered by a
public trial, why should children not be afforded the same
safeguards? If we assume that the foremost function of juvenile
court child protection proceedings is the protection of children, it
follows that the proceedings themselves should be geared to serve
children above everyone else. We should not assume that closed
proceedings run by the child protection stakeholders adequately
protect children, when we insist that only public trials will protect
adult criminal defendants from judicial oppression and
prosecutorial abuse.
195. Id. (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn. 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975)).
196. See In reT.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 447 (Ohio 1990).
197. See San Bernadino County Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Superior Court, 283
Cal. Rptr. 332, 334 (Ct. App. 1991).
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IV. MINNESOTA'S PILOT PROJECT FOR OPENJUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
In summer 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court established
the Foster Care and Adoption Task Force, 199 comprised of thirty-
one members and several unofficial adjunct members to consider,
among other issues, whether Minnesota should open its child
protection hearings. 00 The Task Force was chaired by Judge
Edward Toussaint, Jr., Chief Judge of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, and Chief Justice Kathleen A. Blatz of the Minnesota
199. See Minn. S. Ct. Order No. C2-95-1476 (Oct. 1995).
200. The members included: Gail D. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, Third
Judicial District; Honorable David R. Battey, District CourtJudge, Seventh Judicial
District; Honorable Robert A. Blaesser, District Court Judge, Fourth Judicial
District; John Blahna, Guardian Ad Litem, United Way; Gail Chang Bohr,
Executive Director, Children's Law Center of Minnesota; Susan Carlson, Referee,
Fourth Judicial District, and First Lady of Minnesota; Gary A. Debele, Walling and
Berg, Minneapolis; Anita Fineday, Attorney, Walker, Minnesota; Julie K- Harris,
Assistant Minnesota Attorney General; Susan Harris, Assistant Washington County
Attorney; Mary Jo Brooks Hunter, Adjunct Professor and Clinical Instructor,
Hamline Law School; Chief Justice for the Ho Chunk Nation Supreme Court;
Sheryl Ramstad Hvass, Rider, Bennett, Egan and Arundel, Minneapolis (now
Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections); Kristine Kolar, Chief Public Defender,
Ninth Judicial District; Senator David L. Knutson, Minnesota Senate; Dr. C. L.
Moore, Pediatric and Family Psychology Center; Irene Opsahl, Attorney, Legal Aid
of Minneapolis; Chris Reardon, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney; Denise Revels
Robinson, Director, Family and Children's Services Division, Minnesota
Department of Human Services; Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney; Dr.
David Sanders, Director, Hennepin County Child and Family Services; Honorable
Heidi S. Schellhas, District Court Judge, Fourth Judicial District; Representative
Wes Skoglund, Minnesota House of Representatives; Susanne Smith, Hennepin
County Guardian Ad Litem Program Supervisor; Erin Sullivan Sutton, Interim
Director, Family and Children's Services Division, Minnesota Department of
Human Services; Representative Barbara Sykora, Minnesota House of
Representatives; Professor Esther Wattenberg, Center for Urban Affairs. The
unofficial adjunct members included: Mark R. Anfinson, Attorney, Minneapolis;
Honorable Lindsay Arthur, Retired District CourtJudge; Susan Bownes, Hennepin
County Juvenile and Family Courts Manager; Diane Daehlin, Executive Director,
Children's Home Society; Don Gemberling, Minnesota Department of
Administration; Honorable Roland Faricy, District Court Judge, Second Judicial
District; Susan Gegen, Assistant Public Defender, First Judicial District; Jacquelyn
Hauser, Executive Director, W.A.T.C.H.; Michael Johnson, Staff Attorney, State
Court Administration; John Kane, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender;
Honorable Leslie M. Metzen, District CourtJudge, FirstJudicial District; Andrew
Mitchell, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney; Warren Sagstuen, Assistant Public
Defender, Fourth Judicial District; Marian Saksena, Law Clerk, Children's Law
Center of Minnesota; Ted Stamos, Children's Home Society; Mark Toogood,
Guardian Ad Litem, Hennepin County Guardian Ad Litem Program. See
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT FOSTER CARE & ADOPTION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1-
3 (1997) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
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201
Supreme Court. Justice Sandra Gardebring of Minnesota
Supreme Court served as the Supreme Court liaison. The task
force was divided into two committees and eight subcommittees. I
202served as chairperson of the "Open Hearings" subcommittee.
In January 1997, a majority of the Task Force recommended
that hearings involving children in need of protection or services
(CHIPS) and termination of parental rights be open to the public,
similar to criminal proceedings. 3 In other words, they should be
presumed open to the public in the absence of "exceptional
circumstances. "204 The Task Force also recommended public access
to the corresponding juvenile file, except for certain documents
and reports. A majority of the Task Force believed that the
juvenile protection system was a "closed system" that was not• 206
accountable to the public. A majority also believed that the
closed sTstem concealed abuses and insufficient funding within the
system.
Four Task Force members who opposed open child protection
hearings submitted a minority report. ° The minority believed that
children would suffer "emotional harm and embarrassment" from
media exposure of family secrets. 209 Minority members worried that
incest victims would be more reluctant to report abuse because of
embarrassment with family and friends.2 0  Those members also
expressed fears that exposure of family dysfunction might deter
rehabilitation and reunification of families, and that parents would
be reluctant to make admissions in court.21 The minority also
201. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 200, at 2. At the time of the ChiefJustice
Blatz's service on the Task Force, she served as a district court trial judge in the
Fourth Judicial District (Hennepin County). She was appointed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court as Justice in April 1996 and promoted to ChiefJustice in January
1998.
202. See id. at 2. One of the Task Force's charges was to assess "whether open
hearings in juvenile court matters (other than delinquency) protection cases are
desirable and suggest models for these hearings." Id. at 4.
203. See id. at 120.
204. Id. at 123.
205. See id. at 124. The Final Report recommended excluding documents that
would cause the child emotional or psychological harm or would reveal the
identity of informants. See id.
206. See id. at 120.
207. See id.
208. See id. app. at D-1.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. app. at D-2.
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expressed concern that the media would not portray an accurate
picture of cases or the child protection system, and that special
interest groups and disenfranchised family members might use the
media to further their purposes at the expense of the children. 2
The Task Force issued its recommendations to the supreme
213214
court and bills were introduced in the House and Senate. The
House Judiciary Committee, chaired by Rep. Wes Skoglund, DFL-
Minneapolis, heard testimony and recommended a pilot project.2
Although the House passed a bill by a substantial majority to
include all districts in a pilot project, the Senate passed a bill
allowing only limited access.2 Before the House bill passed, the
Conference of Chief Judges voted to recommend against a pilot
project opening child protection hearings to the public.
Ultimately, the legislature did not pass legislation authorizing open
child protection hearings on a permanent basis or through a pilot
project.
Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota Supreme Court asked the
Conference of Chief Judges to revisit the issue of a pilot project.
The Conference of Chief Judges did revisit the issue and
recommended that the court establish rules for a pilot project in
certain limited jurisdictions in which child protection proceedings
would be presumed open. This recommendation was made subject
212. See id.
213. The timing of the final report of the Task Force, January 1997, is
noteworthy, especially for the purpose of dispelling what appears to be a
widespread erroneous belief that the impetus to open child protection
proceedings resulted from the death of a three-year-old girl, Desi Irving. Prior to
her death, a child protection proceeding involving Desi had been dismissed. Desi
died at the hands of her mother on February 7, 1997. At the time of her death,
she was covered with cuts and cigarette burn marks and had a bruised forehead.
According to a neighbor who tried to resuscitate Desi, she was so thin, her ribs
could be seen. See Jim Adams, Mother is Held in Slaying of 3-year-old Girl, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 8, 1997, at BI. The Task Force issued its final report
in January 1997, before Desi's death, and without any knowledge of her
circumstances. However, it might be true that "Desi's murder [in 1997] and
unanswered questions about whether the system had failed her, whether social
workers should have known about the failures of a mother who had failed before,
became a catalyst for [the open child protection hearings pilot project]." Chris
Graves, A Child's Death Opens Window to Child Protection, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul),June 14, 1998, at Al.
214. SeeJOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 80th Legis. Sess. 89 (Minn. 1997) (introducing
H.F. 24, 80th Legis. Sess. (Minn. 1997));JOuRNAL OF THE SENATE, 80th Legis. Sess.
371 (Minn. 1997) (introducing S.F. 855, 80th Legis. Sess. (Minn. 1997)).
215. SeeJOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 80th Legis. Sess. 329-30 (Minn. 1997).
216. SeeJOURNAL OF THE HOUsE, 80th Legis. Sess. 3451-52, 3929 (Minn. 1997);
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 80th Legis. Sess. 1718 (Minn. 1997).
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to the conditions that: 1) Hennepin County would be included in
the pilot project and other jurisdictions to be included would be
representative of urban, rural, metro and out-state, with the advice
of the Conference of Chief Judges; 2.) the pilot project would last
three years with an independent evaluation to commence after one
year; 3.) the independent evaluation would focus on whether the
pilot project succeeds in greater accountability and public
awareness, whether children have been adversely affected by the
open CHIPS proceedings or public access to court files, and
whether the media have been responsible in reporting CHIPS files
in the name of parents, not the children; 4.) names, contents and
public accessibility of files would be dealt with in certain defined
ways; and 5.) child protection hearings would be presumed open
and could be closed or partially closed by a judge only in
exceptional circumstances with a request by all parties to close a
hearing to be a factor to be used by presiding judges in
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist. On January
6, 1998, the Conference of Chief Judges approved the
recommendations of the Subcommittee on Open CHIPS Report
and Recommendations.
The Minnesota Supreme Court authorized each of the ten
judicial districts to conduct a three-year pilot project in one or
217
more counties designated by the chief judge of the district, using
open hearings in juvenile court proceedings involving: child in
need of protection or services, including permanent placement
proceedings, termination of parental rights proceedings and
subsequent state ward reviews.2Z 8 The pilot project would begin
June 1, 1998, and continue until June 2001.219 The Minnesota
Supreme Court ordered that "[o]pen proceedings authorized
pursuant to this order shall be presumed open and may be closed
or partially closed by the presiding judge only in exceptional
217. See Amended Order Establishing Pilot Project on Open Hearings in
Juvenile Protection Matters, File No. C2-95-1476 (Minn. S. Ct., filed Feb. 5, 1998),
in BENCH & B. Or MINN., Mar. 1998, at 41 [hereinafter Pilot Project Order]. The
counties participating in the pilot project are: Goodhue and LeSueur (First
Judicial District); Houston (Third Judicial District); Hennepin (Fourth Judicial
District); Watonwan (Fifth Judicial District); St. Louis (SixthJudicial District); Clay
(Seventh Judicial District); Stevens (Eighth Judicial District); Marshall,
Pennington and Red Lake (Ninth Judicial District); and Chisago (Tenth judicial
District). See REQUEST FOR REVISED PROPOSALS: EVALUATION OF OPEN HEARINGS IN
JUVENILE PROTECTION MATTERS, STATE CT. ADMIN'R, MINN. Sup. CT. 6 (1998).
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• ,,220
circumstances. The court discussed evaluation of the pilot
projects and established the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Open Juvenile Protection Hearings" "to consider
and recommend rules regarding public access to records relating
to open juvenile protection hearings." "' The advisory committee
filed its recommendations by the April 15, 1998 deadline 22 and on
May 28, 1998, the supreme court adopted a Rule on Public Access
224
to Records Relating to Open Juvenile Protection Proceedings.
In summer 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court asked the
advisory committee to assist in the selection of an independent
evaluator of the pilot project and serve as consultant to the chosenS 225
evaluator. In February 1999, the National Center for State Courts
226
(NCSC) was chosen to conduct the evaluation. In July, August
and September, 1999, the NCSC conducted site visits to review
220. Id.
221. The members of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Open
Juvenile Protection Hearings are: Honorable Heidi S. Schellhas (chair), District
CourtJudge, Fourth Judicial District; Mark Anfinson, Esq.; Candace J. Barr, Niemi
& Barr, PA; Kate Fitterer, President, Minn. Assoc. of Guardians Ad Litem;
Honorable Donovan W. Frank, District Court Judge, Sixth Judicial District (Judge
Frank has since been appointed to the federal bench in the District of Minnesota
and has resigned from the Advisory Committee); Susan Harris, Assistant
Washington County Attorney; Mary Jo Brooks Hunter, Adjunct Professor and
Clinical Instructor, Hamline School of Law; Tom Hustvet, Social Servs. Director,
Houston County; Honorable Gregg E. Johnson, District Court Judge, Second
Judicial District; Marietta Johnson, Deputy Court Administrator, St. Louis County;
Deb Kempi, Ct. Manager, Juvenile Court, Fourth Judicial District (now replaced by
her successor, Anna Lamb); Honorable Thomas G. McCarthy, District Court
Judge, First Judicial District; Honorable Gary J. Meyer, Chief Judge of District
Court, Tenth Judicial District; Richard Pingry, Section Supervisor, Protection and
Intervention Servs., St. Louis County Soc. Servs. Dep't; Warren Sagstuen, Assistant
Pub. Defender in Hennepin County; Dr. David Sanders, Dir. of Hennepin County
Dep't of Children and Family Servs.; Honorable Terri J. Stoneburner, District
Court Judge, Fifth Judicial District; Erin Sullivan Sutton, Minn. Dep't of Human
Servs.; and Mark Toogood, Hennepin County Guardian Ad Litem Program. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Order Promulgating Rule on Public Access to Records Relating to
Open Juvenile Protection Proceedings, File No. C2-95-1476 (Minn. S. Ct., filed
May 28, 1998), in BENCH & B. Or MINN., July 1998, at 40 [hereinafter Access
Order]. The Access Order and Advisory Committee comments have been
reprinted in the following two sources: MINN. Juv. CT. R., Rule on Public Access to
Records Relating to Open Juvenile Protection Proceedings (1998); MINN. STAT.
ch. 260 (1998).
224. See Access Order, supra note 223, at 40.
225. See Pilot Project Order, supra note 217, at 41.
226. See Order Authorizing Access to Records and Proceedings of Open
Hearings Pilot Project, File No. C2-95-1476 (Minn. S. Ct., filed July 6, 1999), in
BENCH & B. OF MINN., Aug. 1999, at 47-48.
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court files, observe hearings and interview judicial system
stakeholders such as judges, county attorneys, public defenders,
social workers, guardian ad litems and court administrators. The
NCSC has collected data from early October 1999 and will submit a
progress report to the advisory committee in February 2000. Data
collection will continue through the end of the three-year pilot
project onJune 18, 2001.
V. RECEPTION OF THE PILOT PROJECT
Commencement of the pilot project aroused controversy
among professionals involved in child protection hearings.
Watonwan County District Judge Terry Dempsey worried that
exposure of "the gory details" of child abuse cases would harm•. 228
children in small communities. Watonwan County Public
Defender John Docherty believed that open child-protection
hearings would expose families whose main offense was poverty:
"These people are at a vulnerable point in their lives....
Embarrassing them will not be helpful."m On the other hand, Le
Sueur County child protection investigator Victor Atherton argued
that publicity would inform local communities of the problems in
their midst: "[P]eople can't fathom some of the things that
occur.... Our whole department is in favor of open hearings."
2
30
Atherton noted that he has investigated children of the children he
231investigated years ago. Watonwan County Attorney Todd
Kosovich also supported open hearings, arguing that they would
help recruit neighbors and relatives to assist children by offering to
232serve as foster parents or guardians.
On the first day of the pilot project, the Star Tribune reported
that "[t]he day overflowed with grim, tearful parents and harried
officials with dockets far bigger than the available hours."2 33 Judge
John Stanoch, then Chief Judge of Juvenile Court in Hennepin
County, responded: "That's just a daily fact of life down here-and
it's getting worse.... It won't be a bad thing at all if we get some
227. See James Walsh, Open Juvenile Court Raises Concern, STAR TRIB.






233. Bob von Sternberg, Juvenile Court Proceedings Open to Public Scrutiny, STAR
Tam. (Minneapolis-St. Paul) June 23, 1998, at Al.
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publicity and the public gets a sense of the volume and nature of
the work we have to do.
"
On the second day of the pilot project, a Hennepin County
judge expelled reporters from a parental rights hearing of a
Chicago woman whose three children died under suspicious
25circumstances. The case had proceeded behind closed doors for
two years and the judge believed that opening the hearing then
would prevent journalists from adequately assessing the case.236
The judge also expressed serious concern about "leaks of
confidential information to the Chicago Tribune and an attempt by a
KSTP-TV, Channel 5, reporter to 'invade the privacy' of the mother
and her children by trying to interview her at her apartment [the
previous week] .237 An attorney for the Star Tribune requested that
the judge delay the hearing to provide an opportunity for
objections but the judge declined.2 8  Calling the decision
"outrageous," the attorney argued that judges should not close
hearings on grounds that journalists lack familiarity with the prior
history of a case.239 "They are sitting in the editor's chair when they
make a judgment like that. . . . They are substituting their
judgment as to whether we can understand the context. That's just
out of line."2 4
The St. Paul Pioneer Press expressed greater tolerance for the
judge's decision to exclude the press.24' The editor noted that the
judge was "a supporter of opening most child protection
proceedings" and had "announced that a transcript of the closed
hearing [would] be provided, and that future proceedings in this
case would be open. "242 The newspaper concluded that the
decision should not "distract attention" from the pilot project's
goal "to provide more public scrutiny of child protection services
234. Id.
235. See Randy Furst, Judge Ejects Media From Child Protection Hearing on Day Two






241. See Open Children's Cases to Scrutiny: Ruling for Secrecy Frustrating but Logical,
PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), June 26, 1998, at A10. ("Making the transition from a
closed to an open system presents temporary challenges, and defining those
circumstances where closed proceedings will still better serve the interests of
children will take time.").
242. Id.
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and court proceedings, and to better inform the public about the
troubling circumstances faced by many children in our
community.
243
On June 29, 1998, only days after the controversial start of the
pilot program, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
issued a memorandum stating that federal rules prohibited child
protection workers from speaking about or disclosing information
about troubled families in open court if a hearing was open to the
public.244 The memorandum contained at least a veiled threat that
245federal funding was at risk if the rules were violated. In July 1998,
on the basis of this memorandum, public defenders began arguing
that the pilot project threatened approximately $60 million in
federal money for child protection, foster care and adoption
246 247services. Their argument proved unsuccessful 4. Judges in
Hennepin County responded to the arguments by citing a
Minnesota Supreme Court staff memorandum248 demonstrating
that the federal rules permitted release of information about
troubled families once it was submitted to a court.49 On July 16,
1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a press release stating
that the pilot project did not violate federal law.250 The court noted
that other states had conducted open child protection proceedings
for years without adverse federal funding effects. By July 28,
1998, federal officials backed off of their interpretation of the rules,
making it clear that the $60 million in federal funding was not in
2512jeopardy.
243. Id.
244. See James Walsh, Federal Rules May Close Juvenile Court, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul) July 16, 1998, at Al.
245. See id. (noting that although the memo does not threaten any sanctions, it
does state that a violation of federal confidentiality rules will make a state
ineligible for federal money).
246. See James Walsh, Judges Refuse to Close Juvenile Hearings, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul),July 17, 1998, at B1.
247. See id.
248. See State Court Administrator's Office, Advisory Committee Briefing
Paper: Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) + Individuals With
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (1998) (on file with author).
249. See Walsh, supra note 246, at B1.
250. See Rebecca Fanning, Minnesota State Supreme Court Information
Officer, Press Release Regarding U.S. DHHS June 29, 1998 Memorandum (July
16, 1998) (on file with author).
251. See id.; see also James Walsh, Child Protection Experiment Safe, STAR TRiB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), July 28, 1998, at B1.
252. See Walsh, supra note 246, at B1.
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After the pilot project's one-year anniversary, the Minneapolis
Star Tribune noted that "the greatest fear-that troubled children
would be victimized and embarrassed by sensationalized new media
coverage and community scorn-has yet to be realized.
2 11
Participants noted very few problems with the open hearing
project, but expressed disappointment about how few people,
including members of the media, attended hearings. The
decision to assign a reporter to cover juvenile court on a regular
basis is an expensive decision for any newspaper, especially during
a pilot project. Newspapers are faced with a "Catch 22." If a
newspaper does not assign a reporter to cover juvenile court on a
regular basis, its reporter may misreport cases because of
insufficient familiarity with the procedures and substantive events
taking place at child protection hearings. On the other hand, if a
newspaper maintains a regular juvenile court reporter who
becomes proficient in covering child protection proceedings, it will
waste valuable resources if the hearings are closed after the pilot
project ends.
Opening child protection hearings has produced numerous
changes. All insiders, including the court, know that extra effort
must be made to speak in terms understandable to outsiders, such
as members of the public, press or a court-monitoring
organization. Many additional persons, mostly relatives, now
attend child protection proceedings. At a number of hearings, the
gallery has looked like a church wedding with the bride's relatives
on one side of the aisle and the groom's relatives on the other side.
I am heartened to see relatives in the courtroom, even when they
are not on speaking terms with each other. Their actions show that
that they care so much about the children that they not only have
taken the time to come to court, but also have endured contact
with people they do not like. Raising healthy and happy children
"takes a village," and the more people seated in my courtroom
gallery, the better. Furthermore, though a parent might be angry
or embarrassed when "dirty laundry" is aired, I have not observed a
single case in which that embarrassment or anger caused the
25
parent to abandon a reunification plan.
253. David Chanen, Child Protection System's Opening Creates Few Ripples, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),June 22, 1999, at Al.
254. See id.
255. On the basis of anecdotal information, I understand that one judge in
Hennepin County presided over a case involving a death of a child where the
35
Schellhas: Open hild Protection Proceedings in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
VI. NEED FOR CONTINUED OPEN HEARINGS
Opening the doors to child protection proceedings produces
benefits in three areas. First, it serves the best interests of the
children who are the subjects of the proceedings. Second, it
increases resources-namely witnesses-and encourages them to
provide a more accurate picture of the children's circumstances.
Third, open hearings provide a monitoring mechanism for the
child protection system and it stakeholders, including judges.
A. Best Interests of the Children
Children benefit from the presence of extended family
members, neighbors and family friends. Parents are less likely to
deny a drug or alcohol addiction if they know that observers are
present who can dispute their denials. Additionally, these family
and friends often volunteer to serve as placements for children,
sparing children the trauma of being placed with strangers. They
often are the very people who are able to intervene on behalf of the
children when the children are returned to their parents' custody.
These people watch for warning signs of a parent's chemical
dependency relapse or abusive or neglectful behavior. The more
eyes watching and ears listening in a child's life, the greater the
chance that a child will be rescued from abuse or neglect.
Open child protection proceedings may also assist the. 256
psychological recovery of the abused children. As one
commentator notes, "victims of abuse often carry their burden
alone, in secret," and closed proceedings simply "continue the
notion that something shameful has happened, and that no one
should be told."2 57 Open hearings can bring a sense of relief to
victimized youths. The cathartic effect of disclosure brings to mind
discussions among the members of the Minnesota Supreme Court
Foster Care and Adoption Task Force in 1997.2 One task force
media attention allegedly caused a mother to abandon efforts to be reunited with
her remaining children. Apparently, a television photographer followed the
mother down the sidewalk attempting to elicit comments from the mother. A
policy at the Hennepin County Juvenile Justice Center in existence since before
the pilot project prohibits the use of cameras, still or video, in the building.
Judges and referees routinely waive the prohibition in adoption proceedings, at
the request of participants.
256. See Sokol, supra note 39, at 924 (citations omitted).
257. Id.
258. Personal recollection of the author.
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member bemoaned recent newspaper publicity of a sexual abuse
case because the article, by naming the adult defendant, enabled
some readers to determine the identities of the juvenile victims.
The task force member, an assistant county attorney, described it as
re-victimizing the juveniles. Another member, an attorney who
represented the juveniles, explained that the publicity generated
support for the victims and validated the seriousness of the wrongs
committed against them. About the same time, a suburban
Minneapolis high school girl who reported severe sexual and
physical abuse by her parents approached a Minneapolis Star Tribune
reporter and asked to be interviewed about her experience. She
wanted other children and the public to know what can happen in
a home and to encourage them to report their own experiences.
Keeping the courtroom doors closed to the public in child
protection proceedings is one of the many hidden cruelties in
child-rearing. We become part of the problem, rather than part of
the solution, when we perpetuate family secrets about abuse and
neglect.
B. Increased, Better Resources
One commentator recognized that factual questions arising in
child protection proceedings "are among the most difficult, and
most sensitive, litigated in American courtrooms. " 259  The U.S.
Supreme Court has emphasized the considerable risk of error
arising from such cases.2 60 However, "public access enhances
reliability of judicial fact finding. Witnesses are less likely to
testify falsely before the public. Important witnesses unknown to
the parties might come forward voluntarily to testify.265  An
264unknown, uninvolved spectator may be the defense's vital witness.
Public access cases consistently point out that "public attendance
259. See Sokol, supra note 39, at 913 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 60 (1987)).
260. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 104 (1996) (extending the right to a free
transcript to an indigent appealing termination of her parental rights).
261. Sokol, supra note 39, at 913.
262. See State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78,86-87, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806-07 (1966).
263. See United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); see also
Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944) (stating that one of the
main purposes of a public trial is to advertise the event such that persons with
knowledge of the facts will come forward to testify).
264. See Kobli, 172 F.2d at 923.
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discourages perjury and encourages full disclosure by witnesses. 
"
265
Increasing the trustworthiness of witnesses and enhancing the
reliability of the system and judicial fact finding are in the best
interests of all children who become the subjects of child
protection proceedings.
C. Monitoring Mechanisms
Public access to child protection proceedings should, over
time, significantly enhance the system's responsiveness and court
procedure. The key benefit of public access to child protection
proceedings is accountability. The child protection system and
court proceedings are "currently insulated from informed criticism
by the rule of confidentiality, and 'criticism is valuable in direct
relation to the degree it is informed."'2 6 When child protection
proceedings are not open to the public, the public learns only what
the stakeholders choose to disclose. Such disclosure will occur only
as a result of the stakeholders' own interests, and not because of
"the public's or the child's interest," because the stakeholders "are
the individuals with the greatest incentive to maintain the status
quo.,, 67 Public access permits the press and public to observe child
protection stakeholders and monitor any abuses. "An injustice
committed in private is a very different thing than an injustice
committed under the watchful eye of even one disinterested
observer," and public access will grant an opportunit% for many
watchful eyes to safeguard the child protection process.
Although some stakeholders in the child protection system
insist that they conduct themselves no differently in the courtroom
when people whom they do not know are present, my personal
observations suggest otherwise. When the courtroom gallery
contains people that the stakeholders believe to be representatives
of the media or a court monitoring organization, the stakeholders
conduct themselves more professionally, explaining the facts in the
cases and their clients' positions with greater thoroughness and
care.
Public scrutiny also should serve as a salutary restraint upon
the broad discretion possessed by juvenile court judges. Public
265. Sokol, supra note 39, at 913.
266. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89, 94 (D. Mass. 1993).
267. Sokol, supra note 39, at 921-22.
268. Id. at 922.
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trials help to prevent not only gross abuses of judicial power but
also lesser evils such as indolence or petty arbitrariness. In no
other area of the law is the court vested with more decision-making
discretion than in child protection proceedings. Child protection
proceedings tend to be one-sided contests between a powerful state
and parents from the most powerless segments of our society.
27°
The danger of discretionary abuse is magnified by the fact that
child protection decisions rarely undergo appeal, a major check to
judicial error and unfairness. Public access would safeguard
parents and children from judicial abuses of discretion. As one
decision noted, "[i]n acting under the public gaze, [judges] are
more strongly moved to a strict conscientiousness in the
performance of duty. In all experience, secret tribunals have
exhibited abuses which have been wanting in courts whose
procedure was public."
272
Further, publicity would likely have a salutary effect on judicial• • • 273
and litigant behavior. In modem child protection proceedings,
at least in Hennepin County, the state and the parents engage in
full adversarial contests. If both sides are aware of the public
scrutiny, the adversarial contest also would remain a contest of
civility.
State court administrations should mandate that all juvenile
court judges receive high-quality training regarding their
responsibilities under the federal child protection Acts. In
districts where juvenile court cases comprise only a portion of
judicial caseloads, all judges should receive this type of education.
The training should cover the purposes and requirements of the
269. See Kobli, 172 F.2d at 921. "The knowledge that every criminal trial was
subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion was regarded
as an effective restraint on possible abuse ofjudicial power." Id.
270. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 (1981) ("The
parents are likely to be people with little education who have an uncommon
difficulty in dealing with life, and who are at the hearing thrust into a distressing
and disorienting situation.").
271. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 104 (1996) (stating that "appeals are
few" in parental status termination cases); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets,
and Scarlet Letter: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 102 (1991) (discussing how open trial proceedings improves the
character and judgment of the citizenry).
272. Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir.
1983) (quoting 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW §
1834, at 438 (J. Chadboum rev. 1976)).
273. See id. at 916.
274. See Section II.B., supra.
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Acts, the impact of the Acts on children and families, and the
necessity of adequate findings to meet federal requirements for
275funding. Juvenile court judges possess considerable impact on
the delivery of social services to children and families. Judges can
advocate additional services as well as timely delivery of existing
services. By closely monitoring the performance of social service




Minnesota will not be alone if it decides to open child
protection hearings on a permanent basis. Many jurisdictions have
adopted statutes or court rules that require or permit public access
to juvenile courts in child protection hearings, including Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
277Texas and Washington.
If juvenile court proceedings are closed to the public, how
does anyone know whether social service agencies effectively deliver
services to needy children and families or whether juvenile court
judges properly monitor the work of the social service agencies? A
spectacular case occasionally receives media attention when a
reporter obtains information from a related adult criminal
proceeding or a party litigant. Such cases, however, provide only
narrow and skewed pictures of the child protection system. With
that exception, the public virtually has known nothing about
juvenile court and social service agencies as they relate to child
protection. This lack of knowledge has resulted from the exclusion
of the public and press from juvenile court child protection
proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSION
On August 18, 1997, prior to commencement of the pilot
project for open child protection hearings, the Star Tribune
published an editorial titled "Abuse and Apathy," which addressed
the death of Desi Irving in February 1997. Audrey D. Saxton, a
275. See Edwards, supra note 41, at 12.
276. See id. at 13.
277. See Walsh, supra note 227, at B1.
278. See Abuse and Apathy: Looking at a Little Girl's Life, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-
[Vol. 26:3
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/2
20001 OPEN CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS IN MINNESOTA 671
child protection worker since 1985, responded with a
"Counterpoint" article published twelve days later.279 It is one of
the most compelling pieces I have read in support of open child
protection hearings. Saxton wrote:
Sometimes decisions that are literally life and death to
children are made without full knowledge or deliberation
due to the inattention of the judge, the fraternity
mentality of the attorneys or the incompetence of the
social worker. And sometimes even the brightest, most
experienced and dedicated public servants don't know
what's best.
Until we decide that juvenile court hearings should be
open to public scrutiny with protection of the identities of
the children, things will continue as they are. Until we
decide that funding streams will no longer determine
policy within our social institutions, kids will be kept in or
returned to homes that are deadly harmful. And until we
change the laws that effectively grant parental rights to
their children over the children's rights to health and
safety, we will have more Desis. 2s°
Almost seventeen months have passed since the open child
protection hearings pilot project began. Based upon personal
observation and experience, it is fair to opine that, at least in
Hennepin County, none of the opponents' concerns have come to
fruition. Opponents to open hearings believe that it is unethical to
subject some children to this pilot while the impact is being
studied, especially when the families involved in child protection
are primarily poor. Many factors contribute to parental abuse of
children, including the parents' own histories of childhood
neglect. These parents deserve to be treated with compassion in
the child protection system. Our sympathy, however, must not
St. Paul), Aug. 18, 1997, at A10 ("[There are] preposterous confidentiality rules
that govern child-protection cases-rules the Legislature declined to loosen this
past session. The secrecy surrounding these cases might shield a few abusive
parents or bungling officials from shame, but it does nothing for children like
Desi. .. ").
279. See Audrey D. Saxton, The Flaws that Get in the Way of Child Protection, STAR
TRiu. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 30, 1997, at A23.
280. Id.
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extend to excuses for child abuse or neglect. As a civil and decent
society, we cannot condone the abuse and neglect of children,
regardless of its causes. More importantly, we cannot condone a
system that promotes secrecy of that abuse and neglect.
Criticism of the media may have some justification, but it is not
sufficient to override the benefit it provides in shedding light on
the system. Is the media likely at some point to make an error in
judgment that would result in hurting a child? Yes, but even such a
mistake should not serve as a reason to terminate the pilot project.
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use
of everything, and in no instance is this more true than in
that of the press. It has accordingly been decided by the
practice of the States, that it is better to leave a few of its
noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by
pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding
the proper fruits. And can the wisdom of this policy be
doubted by any who reflect that to the press alone,
chequered as it is with abuses, the world is indebted for all
the triumphs which have been gained by reason and
humanity over error and oppression.. . .'
The child protection system is an institution as important, if
not more important, than any other public institution. Those
involved in the child protection system are responsible for our
nation's most precious resource-children. The public and the
press must insist upon public access to this system to hold it
accountable to society and to the children.
281. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931).
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